BonJours Basic Antifoundationalist Argument :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

BonJours Basic Antifoundationalist ArgumentABSTRACT BonJour argues that there can be no primary empirical beliefs. But expound three and four jointly entail BonJours Rule ones belief that p is reassert only if one justifiably believes the premises of an argument that makes p highly likely which, given human psychology, entails global skepticism. His responses to the charge of skepticism, restricting premise three to basic beliefs and noting that the Rule does not require transparent belief, fail. Moreover, the Rule does not express an epistemic duty. Finally, his argument against this fails since it is false that if an existential state has representational content, then it is in need of justification. I estimate the diagnosis that BonJour mistook the representational content of a cognitive state for the assertive functional role of a belief. Foundationalism may well be false, nevertheless not for BonJours reasons. Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to relatively single versions of it, a strategy which has proven in the main to be lilliputian and ultimately ineffective since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly. (1) BonJour aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the actually soul of foundationalism, the concept of a basic empirical belief, is incoherent. (2) This is a transparent strategy from which we can learn even if, in the end, as I shall argue, it fails. But, first, what is foundationalism? A persons belief is nonbasic just in case it is reassert in virtue of its carnal knowledge to other justified beliefs it is basic just in case it is justified but not in virtue of its relation to other justified beliefs. Foundationalism is the view that if one has a nonbasic belief, then in the final analysis it is justified in virtue of its relation to a basic belief. Basic beliefs comprise the foundation of a persons network of justified beliefs. Now to B onJours argument.1. The Argument StatedBonJour summarizes it like this1. Suppose, for reductio, that there are basic empirical beliefs.2. A belief is justified only if there is a reason why it is likely to be true.3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive self- self-will of such a reason.4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is likely to be true.